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It is a shibboleth of private capital that the less government, the better-"the
fewer laws, the less confided power." Since the dosing of the frontier, our national
history has been marked by the ceaseless struggle of industry to guard its freedom
of decision against the encroachment of governmental restraint.
During the past four years, one great segment of American business has seemingly
rejected this traditional policy. The insurance industry has not only supported but
solicited the enactment by all state legislatures of a comprehensive network of regulatory statutes. Such regulation deals with the lifeblood of an industry-what it
may sell and the price it may charge. An analysis of this new system, and its
probable success or failure, is the concern of this paper. But an understanding of the
matter requires more than a statement of existing facts. We must examine the
origins of this anomalous development, must trace the succession of events which
led an industry to ask that government be granted a greater voice in its business
decisions.

THE SOUTH-EASMTN UNDERWRITERS AssocIATIoN CAsE

On June 5, 1944 in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,' the Supreme Court of the United States by a 4-3 decision determined for the first time
that (i) an insurance company conducting a substantial part of its business across
state lines is engaged in "commerce among the several States" and is subject to
regulation by Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and (2) the
Sherman Antitrust Act is applicable to the business of insurance.
For seventy-five years the Court had consistently held that the Commerce Clause
did not deprive the individual states of power to regulate or to tax specific activities
of foreign insurance companies which sold policies within their territories. 2 In the
course of these decisions the Court had stated that "issuing a policy of insurance
is not a transaction of commerce,"'3 "the business of insurance is not commerce,' 4
*A.B., L.LB.; Member of the bars of the Supreme Court of the United States and New York. General
Counsel, National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters.
1322 U. S. 533 ('944), 44 CoL L. REv. 772. The case is the subject of Powell, Insurance As Commerce, 57 HAzv. L. RPV. 937 (i944).
2First held in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868). Subsequent cases are collected in BERNARD
C. GAviT, THE ColsEtcE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 134-139 (932).
The precise
question of whether Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate insurance
transactions had never been submitted to the Court.
' Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 183 (U. S. 1868).
'Hooper v. California, X55 U. S. 648, 655 (1895).
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and "contracts of insurance are not commerce at all, neither state nor interstate.' '

On such decisions, and an assumption of consequent lack of federal power, was
founded the system of insurance regulation by the several states.
In the S.E.UA. case Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a majority of the seven
Justices who participated,' analyzed these authorities. He pointed out that certain
activities of a business may be intrastate and therefore subject to state control, while
other activities of the same business may be interstate and therefore subject to
federal regulation. He observed that there is a wide range of business and other
activities which, though subject to federal regulation, are so intimately related to
local welfare that, in the absence of Congressional action, they may be regulated
or. taxed by the states. The primary test applied by the Court to such activities,
the Justice said, is not the mechanical one of whether the particular activity affected
by the state regulation is part of interstate commerce, but rather whether, in each
qase, the competing demands of the state and national interests involved can be
accommodated. Reviewing the varied activities which had been held by the Court
to.be interstate commerce, he declared:
Nbt only, then, may transactions be commerce though non-commercial; they may be commerce though illegal and sporadic, and though they do not utilize common carriers or
concern the flow of anything more tangible than electrons and information. These activities
having already been held to constitute interstate commerce, and persons engaged in them
therefore having been held subject to federal regulation, it would indeed be difficult now
to hold that no activities of any insurance company can ever constitute interstate commerce
so as to make it subject to such regulation;-activities which, as part of the conduct of a
legitimate and useful commercial enterprise, may embrace integrated operations in many
states and involve the transmission of great quantities of m6ney, documents, and communications across dozens of state lines.
He concluded :8
No commercial enterprise of any kind iwhich conducts its activities across state lines has
been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of insurance.
. The majority next held that the comprehensive language of the Sherman Act
embraced the business of insurance and that there existed no evidence of a contrary
Congressional intent. If exceptions are to be written into the Act, "they must come
from the Congress, not this Court."9 The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidated many state laws regulating insurance was dismissed as "exaggerated. 1 The majority accordingly held that a conspiracy to restrain interstate
trade and commerce by fixing and maintaining arbitrary and non-competitive premium rates on fire and allied lines of insurance in six states, and a conspiracy to
monopolize such interstate trade and commerce, are violations of the Sherman Act.
$New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, 510 (r953).
6
Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
8
"322 U. S. 533, 549, 550 (1944).
Id. at 553.
9
Id. at 561.
" Id.at 562.
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The decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,1 which had
sustained a demurrer to the indictment, was reversed.
Three Justices dissented. In a lengthy opinion the late Chief Justice Stone discussed what he believed to be the two questions presented: (i) whether the business.
of entering into contracts in one state, insuring against the risk of loss by fire of
property in others, is itself interstate commerce, and (2) whether an agreement or
conspiracy to fix the premium rates of such contracts and in other ways to restrict
competition in effecting policies of fire insurance, violates the Sherman Act.
The Chief Justice declared :12
The court below has answered "no" to both of these questions. I think that its answer is
right and its judgment should be affirmed, both on principle and in view of the permanency which should be given to the construction of the commerce clause and the Sherman Act in this respect, which has until now been consistently adhered to by all branches
of the Government.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in the opinion of the Chief Justice in a brief
separate dissent. He held that the relations of the insurance business to national
commerce and finance undoubtedly afford constitutional authority for appropriate
regulation by Congress of the business of insurance, "certainly not to a less extent
than Congressional regulation touching agriculture."' 3 But he believed that the
Sherman Act had never been intended to apply to insurance transactions such as
those charged by the indictment and could find "no Congressional warrant" for
causing the "far-reaching dislocations" referred to by the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Jackson.
In a separate dissent Mr. Justice Jackson addressed himself to what he termed
the "practical and ultimate choice" that faced the Court "to say either that insurance
was subject to state regulation or that it was subject to no existing regulation at
all."' 14 He reviewed the previous Supreme Court decisions, the growth of insurance
regulation by the several states, and the absence of Congressional legislation. He
declared that while a modern insurance business as usually conducted is in fact
commerce, in contemplation of law insurance had acquired an established doctrinal
status not based on present-day facts. "For constitutional purposes a fiction has
been established, and long acted upon by the Court, the states, and the Congress,
115x F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ga. 1943). The case went to the Supreme Court on direct appeal under
the Criminal Appeals Act, 56 STAT. 271 (1942), 18 U.S.C. §682 (1946), amending 34 STAT. 1246 (I9o7).
"2 322

U. S. at 563.

The majority did not agree with the Chief Justice that the first of thes

questions was presented by the decision of the District Judge, whose construction of the indictment was
binding on such an appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act. Their belief was that the District Court had
held the indictment bad for the sole reason that the entire "business of insurance" (not merely the part of
the business in which contracts are physically executed) can never under any possible circumstances be
"commerce." Id. at 537. See Note, 44 CoL. L. REV. 772, 773 (1944).
" Id. at 583. This belief that the modern business of insurance is not commerce but yet is'subject
to Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, was shared by the Chief Justice. Id. at 562, 563.

It divided the Court, in reasoning but not result, in another case decided in the same term, Polish National
Alliance v. N.L.R.B., 322 U.-S. 643 (1944).
2,322 U. S. at 585.
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that insurance is not commerce."' 5 He stated that the decision could have consequences upon tax liabilities, refunds, liabilities under state law to states or to individuals, and "even criminal liabilities." Because of these facts he believed that while
"abstract logic" might support the majority, "the common sense and wisdom of the
situation seem opposed.'

He concluded :17

To force the hand of Congress is no more the proper function of the judiciary than to
tie the hands of Congress. To use my office, at a time like this, and with so little justification in necessity, to dislocate the functions and revenues of the states and to catapult
Congress into immediate and undivided responsibility for supervision of the nation's
insurance business is more than I can reconcile with my view of the function of this
Court in our society.
While the Supreme Court thus reversed the District Court decision sustaining

the demurrer, the issues in the case were never tried, for reasons hereinafter set
forth.
II
THE McCARRAN Acr

The S.E.U.A. decision immediately became the subject of controversy. Although
Attorney General Biddle issued a statement to the contrary,' 8 many state officials
and insurance executives feared that the foundations of state regulation and taxation
had been shaken.19 It was contended that the decision reversed a Supreme Court
practice instituted by Marshall not to decide a constitutional question except by a

majority of the full Court.20 Others criticized the Department of Justice for proceeding in such a case under the criminal, rather than the civil, provisions of the

Sherman Act. Some saw the decision as the welcome discarding of an unrealistic
fiction. But of paramount importance was a pending struggle in Congress.
briefs as amici cutria urging aflirm'lid. at 588. Thirty-five states, including New York, had filed
ance of the District Court decision sustaining the demurrer; forty-one states later petitioned the Court
for a rehearing (denied, 323 U. S. 81i (1944)).
' Id. at 594, 595.
" Id. at 589.
le 90 Coso. RMe. A3 3 59, A336o (1944). See editorial, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1944, p. 2270, col. x.
Mr. Biddle later announced that no further action under the antitrust laws would be taken until Congress
and the States had an opportunity to act. Joint Hearings before Subcommittees of Committees on the
Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 7 8th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 6, 639 (1944).
" SEN€.
REP. No. 20, 7 9 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945); cf. Congressional debates cited in footnote 24 infra.
Not all insurance interests agreed with this view. See statement of Senator O'Mahoney, Joint Hearing
before Subcommittees of Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess., Pt. 6, 639 (1944). For views within the insurance industry before and after the decision, see
Newspaper editorial
generally FLMER W. SAwYER, INsuRA EN As INTERsTATE COMMERCR (1945).
opinion is summarized in Note, 44 COL. L. REV. 772, 773 n. i0 (1944) as "in general, violently opposed to
the decision."
"5 Charles Warren, N. Y. Times, June 8, 1944, p. 16, cols. 2, 3. Contra: Note, 44 COL. L. REV. 772,
773 (1944); letters, Hinds and Fracnkel, N. Y. Times, June 12, 1944, p. x8, col. 6. In Insurance As
Commerce, 57 HARv. L. Rv. 937, 938 (1944), the redoubtable Professor Powell commented: "What
respect such minority assumption of reverse leadership should command from mere observers, though
of necessity of minor consequence, is within the constitutional freedom of. each observer. A gracious
pursuer of the judicial course might pay the minority quartette a delicate compliment, too delicate
perhaps for acid analysis, by emulating their courage and independence and thus viewing their views as
they viewed those of their predecessors."
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While the S.E.U.A. case was before the Court, there were introduced in both
Houses of Congress companion bills to exempt the business of insurance from the
Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts 1 To recognize the special problems of insurance and to grant it entire or partial exemption from the antitrust laws, would be
consistent with the precedents established by Congress with respect to many other
industries.22 With opposition including the Department of Justice, the Attorney
General of Missouri, and Senator O'Mahoney, the bills were still being considered
at joint public meetings of House and Senate Judiciary Subcommittees when the
S.E.UA. decision was rendered.
Further hearings were held and bills proposed by various interests. On January
i8,1945, Senators McCarran and Ferguson introduced a measure which, after prolonged debate and substantial amendment, passed both Houses and was approved
by President Roosevelt on March 9, 1945. The text of the statute (hereinafter referred to as the McCarran Act) as enacted, is as follows:
Sec. i. Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on
the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.
Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business
of insurance: provided, That after January i, 1948, the Act of July 2, 189o, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the
Clayton Act, and the Act of September :z6, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission
Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law.
Sec. 3.(a) Until January I, 1948, the Act of July 2, 189o, as amended, known as the
"1H.R. 3270, S. 1362, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced respectively on September 20 and 21, 1943.
See 5Note, 32 GEo. L. J. 66 (1943).
" For exemption of marine insurance, see §29 of the Merchant Marine Act of 192o (41 STAT. 1000
(1920), 46 U.S.C. §885(b)(1946)).
Further illustrative examples of such exceptions are: fishing cooperatives (48 STAT. 1213 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §521 (X946)); agricultural or horticultural cooperatives
(42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §291 (946)); export associations (40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U.S.C.
§62 (946)); shipping agreements approved by the Maritime Commission (39 STAT. 733 (1916), as
amended, 46 U.S.C. §814 (946)); transportation agreements approved by the I.C.C. (24 STAT. 380

(1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §5(1946)); aviation agreements approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
49 U.S.C. §494 (1946); marketing and other agreements approved by the Secretary of Agriculture (48 STAT. 34 (1933), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §6o8 (1946), 5o STAT. 248 (1937),
7 U.S.C. §671 (1946), 49 STAT. 781 (935), 7 U.S.C. §852 (X946)).
'Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. z362, H.R.
3269, and H.R. 3270, 7 8th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Pts. 1-6 (1943-1944). The House passed the bill on
June 22, 1944, by a vote of 283 to 54. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary favorably reported it on
September 20, 1944, with a strong minority dissent. The bill died in the Senate without vote.
2459 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§IoII-IoI5 (1946). For legislative history see House Legislative
Calendar, 7 9th Cong., xst and 2d Sessions, Committee on the Judiciary, Jan. 29, 1946, No. 22, p. 103.
Congressional debate may be found in 91 CONG. Racoan 499-509, II12-1122, 1470-1473, 1548-1559
(1945). As introduced, the measure was based upon a draft by a legislative committee of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. See 91 CONG. Rnc. 504 (945).
52 STAT. 1004 (938),
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Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act,
and the Act of September 26, 19x4, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, and the Act of June i9, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any
agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect in any manner the application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as amended, known as the
National Labor Relations Act, or the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or the Act of June 5, I920, known as the Merchant

Marine Act,

1920.

Sec. 5. As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the several States, Alaska, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
Sec. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the application of such
provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall
not be affected.
In approving the McCarran Act, President Roosevelt issued a public statement
in which he said:2"
I have given my approval to S. 340, the insurance bill, which passed the Congress last
week. This bill grants the insurance business a moratorium from the application of the
antitrust laws and certain related statutes, except for agreements to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or acts of boycott, coercion or intimidation, until January i, 1948. The purpose
of this moratorium period is to permit the States to make necessary readjustments in their
laws with respect to insurance in order to bring them into conformity with the decision of
the Supreme Court in the South-Eastern Underwriters Association case. After the
moratorium period, the antitrust laws and certain related statutes will be applicable in
full force and effect to the business of insurance except to the extent that the states have
assumed the responsibility, and are effectively performing that responsibility, for the regula.
tion of whatever aspect of the insurance business may be involved. It is clear from the
legislative history and the language of this act, that the Congress intended no grant of
immunity for monopoly or for boycott, coercion or intimidation. Congress did not intend
to permit private rate fixing, which the Anti-trust Act forbids, but was willing to permit
actual regulation of rates by affirmative action of the States.
The bill is eminently fair to the States. It provides an opportunity for the orderly correction of abuses which have existed in the insurance business and preserves the right
of the States to regulate in a manner consonant with the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the antitrust laws.
Shortly after the enactment of the McCarran Act, the Government discontinued
26
the S.E.U.A. prosecution in the Northern District of Georgia.
2 White House Press Release, Mar. 10, 1945; National Underwriter, Mar. 15,
1945, p. 22, col. 3;
reprinted in part, N. Y. Tunes, Mar. i, 1945, §5, P. 45, col. 5; never officially reported. [The text
is inaccurately reprinted in various insurance journals and texts, in each of which there are omitted
from the fourth sentence the words, "and are effectively performing that responsibility."] The President
had previously emphasized "affirmative" State regulation in a letter to Senator Radcliffe before the McCarran Act was passed. 91 CONG. REc. 503 (1945).
"' On June 25, 1945 a nolle prosse order signed by District Judge Underwood, with consent of the
Department of Justice, concluded the S.E.U.A. case.
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The "moratorium" period in the Act, originally to end -January I, 1948, subse2
The
quently was extended to June 30, 1948, by Congress on its own initiative
extension was stated by the Senate Judiciary Committee to be desirable "in order
to provide the Congress an additional time to examine into the28situation more completely than it has been able to do during the present session."
III
SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS

Before considering the state regulatory legislation enacted to complement the
McCarran Act, we should review several court decisions affecting that statute. Foremost are three opinions by the Supreme Court and one by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
A. Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin
In PrudentialIns. Co. v. Benjamin,29 the insurance company protested an annual
tax levied by South Carolina on foreign insurers (but not on domestic companies)
as a condition of being authorized to do business within the state. The tax amounts
to three per cent of the aggregate of premiums received from business done in South
Carolina, regardless of its interstate or local character. Citing the &.E.U.A. decision,
the insurer contended that the tax was an unconstitutional discrimination against
interstate commerce in favor of local business. The Court unanimously upheld
I .:
the tax.
The late Mr. Justice Rutledge traced the winding paths of the previous decisions,
commenting that "the history of the commerce clause has been one of very con-

siderable judicial oscillation." The authorities cited by Prudential were distinguished
on the ground that in none of them had Congress acted or purported to act, either

by way of consenting to the state's tax or otherwise. The Court statedV0
None of the decisions conceded, because none involved any question of, the power of
Congress to make conclusive its own mandate concerning what is commerce. But apart
from that function of defining the outer boundary of its power, whenever Congress'
judgment has been uttered affirmatively to contradict the Court's previously expressed view
that specific action taken by the states in Congress' silence was forbidden by the commerce clause, this body has accommodated its previous judgment to Congress' expressed

approval.
Since there was no contention by Prudential that commerce was not involved, the

Court would give effect to the positive expression by the McCarran Act that the

"continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance" is in accord with Congress's policy. The Court thus rejected the argument
of Prudential that the Commerce Clause "of its own force," and without reference to
any action by Congress, forbids discriminatory State taxation of interstate commerce.
11 6 1

STAT. 448 (1947),

"sEN.

15 U.S.C. §1012 (Supp. 1949).

REP. No. 407, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947).
19328 U. S. 408 (1946).
soId.at 424-425.
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Reviewing the McCarran Act, the Court found that it was the intention of Congress to "put the full weight of its power behind existing and future state legislation
to sustain it from any attack under the commerce clause to whatever extent this may
be done with the force of that power behind it, subject only to the exceptions
expressly provided for." The Court declared:1
Moreover, in taking this action [enactment of the McCarran Act] Congress must have had
full knowledge of the nation-wide existence of state systems of regulation and taxation;
of the fact that they differ greatly in the scope and character of the regulations imposed
and of the taxes enacted; and of the further fact that many, if not all, include features
which, to some extent, have not been applied generally to other interstate business. Congress could not have been unacquainted with these facts and its purpose was evidently
to throw the whole weight of its power behind the state systems, notwithstanding these
variations.
South Carolina and Congress had acted in complete coordination to sustain the
tax, the Court noted, and it is therefore "reinforced by the exercise of all the power
of government residing in our scheme. '3' The judgment of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, upholding the tax, accordingly was affirmed.
B. Robertson v. California
In Robertson v. California,3 appellant had been convicted in California of the
crimes of (a) soliciting and selling a policy of insurance without being licensed as
required by law, and (b) acting without a license as an agent for a non-admitted
insurer. The statutes violated are part of California's comprehensive regulatory
scheme for the business of insurance.
The insurer in question was an Arizona corporation not licensed in California.
Its business was transacted largely by radio advertising and use of the mails, in
addition to the use of such agents as appellant. The evidence of non-compliance
with the statutes was undisputed. Appellant's contention was, in effect, that since
the entire series of acts done by him was directed to the conclusion of an interstate
transaction (within the S.E.U.A. decision), those acts, though taking place altogether within California, were inseparably a part of an interstate transaction and
therefore beyond reach of the state's licensing or regulatory power. California's
refusal to license an Arizona insurer for non-compliance with its requirement of
certain reserves was termed an unlawful exclusion of interstate commerce.
The Court rejected these contentions and sustained both statutes. The late Mr.
Justice Rutledge declared."
It would be idle to require licensing of insurance agents, in order to secure honesty and
competence, yet to place no restraint upon the kind of insurance to be sold or the kinds
of companies allowed to sell it, and then to cover their representatives with their immunity. This could only result in placing domestic and complying foreign insurers at
great disadvantage and eventually in nullifying all controls unless or until Congress should
take over the regulation.

31/d. at 430.
3328 U. S. 440 (1946).

*'Id.at 435-436.
"Id. at 457.
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No such consequence has followed from the South-Eatern decision. It did not wipe
out the experience of the states in the regulation of the business of insurance or its effects
for the continued validity of that regulation.
The Court pointed out that there was no showing that this particular insurer's
business was unsound or fraudulent. It was merely that California had the right
to exclude a company for non-compliance with reasonable standards, "until Congress
makes contrary command."
The determination of the Court was made without specific reliance upon the

McCarran Act, first because it was not believed to be necessary and second, because
the acts of appellant were committed after the S.E.U.A. decision but before the
McCarran Act became law.

To avoid "any semblance of retroactive effect in a

criminal matter" the Court refrained from explicit reliance upon the Act, although
Mr. Justice Rutledge declared that it "does not detract from our decision on other
grounds that the McCarran Act, if applied, would dictate the same result."'35
C. The Panhandle Case
In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comn'n of Indiana,6 Mr.

Justice Rutledge on behalf of the Supreme Court summarized the respective powers
of the Federal and State governments under the Natural Gas Act as follows :
The Natural Gas Act therefore was not merely ineffective to exclude the sales now in
question from state control. Rather both its policy and its terms confirm that control.
More than "silence" of Congress is involved. The declaration, though not identical in
terms with the one made by the McCarran Act.. . concerning continued state regulation
of the insurance business, is in effect equally clear, in view of the Act's historical setting,
legislative history and objects, to show intention for the states to continue with regulation
where Congress has not expressly taken over. Cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U. S.408. Congress has undoubted power to define the distribution of power over interstate commerce. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 769, authorities cited; cf.
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, supra. Here the power has been exercised in a manner
wholly inconsistent with exclusion of state authority over the sales in question.
Congress' action moreover was an unequivocal recognition of the vital interests of the
states and their people, consumers and industry alike, in the regulation of rates and service.
Indiana's interest in appellant's direct sales is obvious. That interest is certainly not less
than the interest of California and her people in their protection against the evil effects
of wholly unregulated sale of insurance interstate. Robertson v. California, 328 U. S.440.
D. The North Little Rock Case
In North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 8 a

taxicab company was unable to obtain liability insurance because of its bad accident
experience. It accordingly applied to the Arkansas Automobile Assigned Risk
Plan"9 which assigned the risk to the Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. The Aetna
"Id. at 462.
36332 U. S. 507 (1947).
"Id. at 521.
"181 F. 2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950), aff'g 85 F. Supp. 961 (E. D. Ark. 1949).
lThePlan, similar to those established in many states, is an arrangement whereby all insurers transacting the business within a state agree to an equitable apportionment among them of those risks which
in good faith arc entitled to insurance but are unable to procure it through ordinary methods.
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charged a premium determined by a rating organization of which it was a member
(the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters). The" rating organization was
licensed and regulated by the Arkansas Insurance Department, pursuant to regulatory
statutes enacted subsequent to the McCarran Act.
The taxicab company thereafter sued the rating organization and all the insurers
involved, alleging price-fixing and a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Treble damages
and an injunction were demanded, in accordance with the Sherman Act. We shall
subsequently consider the contentions and decisions in the case with respect to the
state rating laws. However, the plaintiff also charged that the regulatory provisions
of the McCarran Act were unconstitutional and that the acts of the defendants constituted coercion and intimidation, which the McCarran Act forbids the states to
authorize even under regulation.
A motion by the defendants for summary judgment was granted by the District
Court. The court declared :40
The Sherman Act ... applies to transactions of insurance. United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S.533.
Public Law 15 . . . known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act is constitutional. Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin, Insurance Commissioner, 328 U. S. 408.
In the absence of public regulation or tongressional exemption, the price fixing activities of the Bureau involved in this case would, constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 15o, rehearting denied, 310 U. S.

658.
The Sherman Act is not violated by acts authorized and regulated by state statutie.
Parker, Director of Agriculture v. Brown, 317. U. . 341. There the court sid: "We find
nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." 317 U. S. 350, 351. Also Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, etc,, supra. This
also is expressly provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which exempts insurance from
the Sherman Act to the extent that such business is regulated by State law. Act Ix6 of
Arkansas, 1947, constitutes proper regulation within the meaning of that statute. The
acts of the defendants were in accordance with provisions of Act 116 of Arkansas, 1947.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act is not a delegation "to individual States power to legislate in the regulation of insurance transactions coming within the Commerce Clause," but
is a proper division of power between the United States and the several States, a rendering
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power
Commission, 324 U. S. 515. In this case the court found that the congressional action
in extending federal jurisdiction to only "those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States . . "'constituted a legal standard that must be given effect in resolving
conflicting claims by federal and state authorities of power to regulate. 324 U. S. 527.
Also Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin, etc., supra.
With respect to the charge of coercion and intimidation, the court held :41
Nowhere in this record does it appear that any facts or conditions existed which would
justify plaintiff in fearing intimidation, boycott or coercion, or show that any such boycott, intimidation or coercion was attempted or threatened. Certainly the fact that plaintiff
"085 F. Supp. at 964.

," Id. at 965.
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was advised that the insurance contract would be cancelled in accordance with its terms,
unless premium was paid at the established rate is not sufficient. Plaintiff already knew
this when it accepted the contract, and common business practice would have brought
home to him this knowledge and information.
On April 5, i95° the judgment dismissing the complaint was unanimously
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.42 Declaring
that to rule that the McCarran Act is ineffectual or invalid "would be absurd," the
court held that the case "was correctly decided by the District Court."
A petition for certiorari is now pending in the Supreme Court of the United
States.
E. Other Court Decisions
The S.E.U.A. decision and the McCarran Act have also been appraised by other
courts in considering various phases of the insurance business. Their uniform determination has been that under existing circumstances the rights of the states to
regulate and to tax transactions of the business have not been altered.

IV
THE STATE REGULATORY LAWS

When the McCarran Act became law on March 9, 1945, regulation of insurance
by the several states varied from relatively complete supervision of all lines of insurance44 to little or no regulation of many classes. Collaborative activity such as
price-fixing was widespread and long established in most lines of insurance, even in
states with no regulatory statutes. Yet the S.E.U.A. decision had made clear that
such concerted action, when unregulated by public authority, violates the federal
antitrust laws.
Under the McCarran Act, after January i, 1948, such antitrust laws (except
to
boycott, coercion or intimidation) are applicable to the business of insurance
as
only "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law. ' 45 This would
be true even apart from the McCarran Act.4" The measure of State regulation thus
42 18I F. 2d 174 (8th Cir. I95O).

" Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Murphy, 207 S. C. 324, 35 S.E. 2d 586 (945), afl'd, 328 U. S.
408 (1946); Ware v. Travelers Ins. Co., 15o F. 2d 463 ( 9 th Cir. 1945); First Nat. Ben. Soc. v. Garrison,
58 F. Supp. 972 (S. D. Cal. 1945), afl'd, 155 F. 2d 522 (pth Cir. 1946); Glass v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
246 Ala. 579, 22 So. 2d 13 (r945); State of Indiana v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 224 Ind. 17, 64

N.E. 2d 150 (1945), afl'd, 328 U. S. 823 (946); In Re Insurance Tax Cases, 16o Kan. 300, 161 P. 2d.
726 (1945) afl'd, 328 U. S. 8.22 (1946); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Barnett, 200 Miss. 233, 27 So.
2d 6o (1946); Keehn v. Hi-Grade Coal & Fuel Co., 23 N. J. Misc. 102, 41 A. 2d 525 (C.P. 1945); Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania v. Griffiths, 23 N.J. Misc. 96, 41 A. 2d 386 (Dist Ct. x945); Keehn
v. Laubach, 22 N. J. Misc. 380, 39 A. 2d 73 (Dist. Ct. 1944), appeal dismissed, 133 N.J.L. 227, 43 A. 2d
857 (1945); Mendola v. Dineen, 185 N. Y. Misc. 540, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
"E.g., N. Y. INs. LAw, c. 882 (1939).
" McCarran Act, Sec. 2(b); 15 U.S.C. 1012(b) (1946). Because the Act fails to repeat a reference
to the Robinson-Patman Act, the criminal provisions of that statute probably are not applicable to the
business of insurance. Those provisions which are amendments to the Clayton Act are, however, probably applicable "to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
" North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 85 F. Supp. 96z (E. D.
Ark. 1949), afl'd, 181 F. 2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950); Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). During debate
on the McCarran Act Senator O'Mahoney stated: "My whole point has always been that those combina-
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being the yardstick of immunity from the federal antitrust laws, the first problem
confronting state authorities and the industry was to consider what new state

controls should be formulated during the moratorium in order to preserve a7 system
of regulation exclusively by states. Federal regulation found no advocates
To what extent should the new state regulatory laws authorize but regulate
price-fixing and other violations of the Sherman Act? Cooperative action in
rating matters has long been considered to be essential in the business; it is by the
pooling of experience that rates normally are made, and it is by a stabilized rate
structure that rate wars, disastrous to industry and policyholders alike, are avoided.
As far back as 1911, when the Merritt Committee of the New York legislature probed
the problems of fire insurance in order to make recommendations to the Assembly,
the Committee declared :4
It is therefore recommended that no anti-compact bill be passed, but that in place thereof
a statute be enacted that will permit combination under State regulation, such regulation
to stop short of actually fixing the price at which companies shall sell their insurance, but
which shall be of such positive nature that all forms of discrimination in rates will cease;
such statute to provide for the filing by such associations and bureaus of all schedules and
specific rates with the Insurance Department, and also that all such associations and bureaus shall be subject to the closest supervision by the Superintendent of Insurance, and
further that all such associations and bureaus shall keep careful records of their proceedings, and provide for the hearing of interested property-owners who feel aggrieved at the
rate charged-all to the end that the potent power of publicity may operate freely to cure
any arbitrary action or indefensible methods.

It was such reasoning that led to the enactment of laws in many states permitting but regulating cooperative activities in insurance rate-making, long before
the S.E.U.A. decision.49 The Report of the Sub-Committee on Federal Legislation
to the Executive Committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
accordingly stated:°
...Experience has demonstrated that unrestricted competition in the insurance business
is not in the public interest. Practically every state in the Union has upon its statute books
provisions prohibiting unfair discrimination in rates. If unfair discrimination is to
tions which the insurance industry desires to make should have a clearance from some authoritative
spokesman of the public interest." go CoNG. REc. 6627, (1944). This view was exljresscd by Attorney General Biddle in joint Hearings Before Subcommittees of Committees on the Judiciary on S. z36a,
H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 7 8th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 6, 637 et seq. (1944).
"' Desire for regulation by a federal agency at the time was disavowed by the industry, the President,
the Department of Justice, Senator O'Mahoney, and all Congressional sponsors of the legislation. See
joint Hearings before Subcommittees of Committees on the Judiciary on S. z_62, H.R. 3269, and H.R.
In a letter to Senator
3270, 7 8th Cong., ist and 2d Sess. Pts. 1-6, esp. Pt. 6, 637-640 (1943-1944).
Radcliffe, President Roosevelt stated that his administration was "not sponsoring Federal legislation to
regulate insurance or to interfere with the continued regulation and taxation by the States of the business
of insurance." 91 CoNrG. REc. 482 (1945).
8
" Documents of Assembly of State of N. Y., 134 th Sess., Vol. XX, No. 30, Pt. 1, 125 (91).
"0See Note, 33 GEo. L. J. 70 (1944). In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 65 (1940), Mr. Justice
Frankfurter observed: "Government has always had i special relation to insurance. The ways of safeguarding against the untoward manifestations of nature and other vicissitudes of life have long been
withdrawn from the benefits and caprices of free competition."
50
PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL AssociArso.N oF INSURANCE CoarasnssIoNEas 45 (76th Sess. 1945).
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be avoided, there must be reasonable uniformity in the rates. Such uniformity can be
obtained only by cooperation in obtaining statistical data and in the promulgation of rates
based thereon. This result can be obtained only through concert of action.
Uniform state statutes embodying such principles were finally recommended by

the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and an All-Industry Committee, formed at the request of the Commissioners, on which every interest in the
business was represented.
A. The Regulatory Laws
x. Rating Laws: The recommended Uniform Rating Laws were substantially followed by the legislatures in almost all jurisdictions. Material changes were made
in a few states 1 Rate regulation now exists in every state with respect to fire insurance and in every state but Idaho for casualty insurance, fidelity and surety lines,
and inland marine insurance. 2
" Noteworthy variations are: In some states (e.g., Texas, Louisiana and Virginia) the state makes
the rates for many lines; in California and Missouri, rates are filed upon demand by the Commissioner;
in Montana rates must be filed only when made by a combination of insurers.
"2ALA.CODE ANN. tit. 28, §§355-361, 362-387 (fire and marine), 388-411 (casualty) (Supp. 1947);
A.AsKA Com. LAws ANN. tit. 42, §§42-4-1-42-4-21 (fire and marine and casualty combined) (1949);
ARIZONA CODE ANN. c. 61, §§61-iooo--6i-iix8 (fire and marine), 6-2oo.--6&-1217 (casualty) (Supp.

1949); ARs. STAT. ANN. tit.
66, §§66-4o--66-416 (fire and marine), 66-417-66-433 (casualty) (947);
CAL. INS. CODE §11850-1860.3 (fire and marine and casualty combined) (Supp. 1949); COLO. STAT. ANN.
c. 87, §§285"3oo (fire and marine), 301-317 (casualty) (Supp. 1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 42, §§61236137 (fire and marine), 62o2-6217 (casualty) (Rev. 1949); DEL. REV. CODE c. 2o, Art. ii, as added by

c. 16i, Laws 1947 (fire and marine and casualty combined); D. C. CODE tit. 35, §§35-1401-35-1409
(fire), Pub. L. No. 541, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (casualty and inland marine) (Supp. 1948); FLA. STAT.
it. 35, §§629.O1-629.24 (fire and marine), 63o.oi-63o.12 (casualty) (1949); GA. CODE ANN. tit.
56, §§56-200----56-2020 (casualty), 56-21o-56-2118 (fire and marine) (Supp. 1947); HAwMA REv.
LAws tit. 21, §§8551.o-8551.I7 (casualty), 8552.01-8552.16 (fire and marine) (Supp. 1947); ILL.
REv. STAT. C. 73, §§io65.i-io65 . i 8 (casualty), io65.19-o65.35 (fire and marine); IDAHO CODE tit.
41, §§41-2001-41-2018 (fire and marine) [Idaho has not enacted a casualty rate regulatory law]
(1947); IND. STAT. ANN. tit.
39, §§39-5201-39-5219 (casualty), 39-522o-39-5238 (fire and marine)
(Supp. 1949); Iowa Laws 1947, c. 259 (casualty), c. 26o (fire and marine); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
C. 40, §§40-925-40-943 (fire and marine), 40-1113-40-1123 (casualty) (Supp. 1947); Ky. REv. STAT.
C. 304, §§304-6o0-304-617 (fire and marine), 304-625-304-644 (casualty) (950); LA. REv. STAT. tit.
22, §§1401-1422 (fire, marine and casualty combined) (1950); Ma. Rav. STAT. c. 56, §§291-3o9, as
added by C. 274, Laws 1947 (casualty), §§273-29o, as added by c. 275, Laws 1947 (fire and marine)
(1944); M1%.
CODE ANN. Art. 4 8A, §99A (fire and marine), §14oA (casualty) (Supp. 1947); MASs.
LAws ANN. C. 174A (fire and marine), c. 175 A (casualty); Micr. Com. LAws, c. 545, §§545.-545.20
(casualty), c. 546, §§546.1-546.18 (fire and marine); Minn. Laws 1947, c. 119 (casualty), c. 12o (fire
and marine); Miss. CODE tit. 22, §§5817-5834 (fire), 5834-oi--5834-14 (casualty) (Supp. 1948); Mo.
REV. STAT. §5971-5989 (fire) Laws X948, S.B. 144 (casualty) (1939); MONT. REv. CODE tit. 40,
§§40-2401-40-2416 (fire and marine and casualty combined) (x947); NEB. REv. STAT. C. 44,
§§44-1401-44-1442 (casualty), 44-1443-44-1486 (fire and marine) (Supp. 1949); NEv. INS. AtCT,
Art. x5A, §§2.1-I21P (fire and marine and casualty combined); N. H. REv. LAws, c. 3 29 -A, as added
by c. 235, Laws 1947, c. 3 29 -B, as added by c. 261, Laws 1947 (fire and marine and casualty combined);
N. J. STAT. ANN. tt. 17, §§I7:29A-I-g 7 :29A-28 (fire and marine and casualty combined) (Supp.
1949); N. M. STAT. c. 6o, §§6o-61i--6o-627 (fire and marine), 6o-628-6o-644 (casualty) (Supp.
1949); N. Y. INS. Lw, Art. VIII, §§8o-189 (fire and marine and casualty combined); N. C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. C. 58, §§58-125--58-731.9 (fire), 58-3I.IO---58-X3I.25 (casualty), 58-131.26--58-i3l.33 (miscellaneous) (Supp. 1949); N. D. Rav. CODE tit. 26, §§26-28oi---26-2818 (casualty), 26-29026-2917 (fire and marine) (Supp. 1949); OHIo CODE ANN. §§9592-I---9592-18 (fire and marine), 9592-19--9592-35 (casualty) (1948); OK.A. STAT. tit. 36, §§881-891 (casualty), 911-929 (fire and
marine) (Supp. 1949); OE. Coiis. LAws ANN. tit. XOI, §§1o-2001-1-2o19 (casualty), i1-21o0101-2118 (fire and marine) (Supp. 1947); PA. STAT. AN. tit.
40, §§i181-ir99 (casualty), 12i-i238
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Virtually every word of the rating statutes was the subject of extended discussion
and debate. Abbreviated summaries of the laws hence serve little value and the precise text of each section should be reviewed in connection with particular problems.
We may note, however, that in broad outline the fire and other regulatory statutes
provide that:
i. Rates must meet certain standards (they cannot be "excessive, inadequate or

unfairly discriminatory").
2. Rates must be filed with the State Insurance Commissioner, who is granted
various powers if they fail to meet the statutory standards.
3. Companies need not combine in rating matters, but may do so if their
3
organizations are licensed and supervised by the state.
The statutes vest various supplemental powers of administration and enforcement
in the State Insurance Commissioner. They contain appropriate provisions relating
to notice, hearing, and judicial review for all interested parties.
In the North Little Rock case, previously discussed in this article, the Arkansas
rating law involved was the model statute recommended by the N.A.I.C. and the
All-Industry Committee. The plaintiff contended that the statute did not constitute
proper regulation within the meaning of the McCarran Act, that it authorized
coercion and intimidation in violation of that statute, that it violated a provision of
the State Constitution forbidding "monopolies or perpetuities," and that it conflicted
with the state antitrust laws. The United States District Court overruled all of
these contentions and its judgment was affirmed as correct by a unanimous Court of
Appeals.
Fair Trade Practices: Twenty-six states' have enacted "fair trade practices" legislation intended to regulate such activities and hence to effect an ouster of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The usual state statute of this type first prohibits certain
enumerated unfair acts and practices (such as false advertising, defamation of
2.

(fire and marine) (Supp. 1949); P. R. Acts 1948, Act No. 28 (fire and marine and casualty combined);
R. I. Laws 1948, C. 2088 (fire and marine), c. 2089 (casualty); S. C. INS. LAW, Art. io, §§81o8-8Io8.x7
(fire and marine), Art. 11, §§81o9-8io9-x 9 (casualty) (1947); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 14, c. 6, §96356.1
-6356.9 (fire and marine), 6356.2o-6356.3, (casualty) (Supp. x949); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. tit. 78,
Arts. 4878-4905c (fire and marine), Art. 4698a (casualty), Art. 4682b (motor vehicle) (1948); UTAHt
CODE ANN. tit. 43, §§43-x8-1-43-18-15 (fire and marine and casualty combined) (Supp. 1949); Vr.
REv. STAT. tit. 42, c. 394, §§9274-9286 (fire, marine and casualty) (x947); VA. CODE tit. 38, C. 8,
§§39-194-38-218.12

(fire),

c. 8.1,

§38-247-38-253.42

(casualty),

c. 8.2,

§§38-253.43-38-253.88

(inland marine and sprinkler) (1950); WASH. RFv. STAT. ANN. it. 45, Art. 19, §§45.19.o0-45.x9.43
(fire and marine and casualty combined) (Supp. 1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. C. 33, Art. 4A, §§3381(1).
3381(9) (fire and marine), Art. 15, §§3472(47)-3472(67) (casualty) (1949); WIs. INs. LAWs C. 203,
§§203.32(l)-203.32(17)

(fire and marine), c. 204, §9204.37-204.55

(casualty); WYo. CoM.

STAT. C.

52, Art. 14, §§52-1401---52-1418 (fire and marine), Art. 15, §§52-1501-52-1518 (casualty) (Supp.
1949).
" This is in accord with the expressed desires of Congress, which during Committee consideration of
the McCarran Act emphasized that Congress did not intend to "require or encourage" the several states
to enact legislation which would compel any insurer to become a member of a rating bureau or charge
uniform rates. See H.R. REP. No. 68, 7 9 th Cong., ist Sess. (945).
" Ark., Clo., Fla., Ga., Ind., Ky., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Neb., Nev., N. H., N, J.,
N. M., N. C., Pa., S. C., S. D., Tenn., Utah, Wash., and Wis.
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competitors, rebates, etc.). The Insurance Commissioner is empowered to issue cease
and desist orders against violations, after due notice and hearing. The statute further contains a general prohibition of acts which the Commissioner finds, after
hearing, to be unfair or deceptive. These may be reported to the Attorney General
of the state, who is empowered to commence court proceedings to enjoin and restrain
their continuance.
3. Inter-Locking Controls: Ten states 5 have passed statutes designed to deal
with the types of inter-locking controls which are forbidden by the Clayton Act.
These laws usually provide that interlocking directorates and purchases of other
company stock are authorized unless competition would be substantially lessened or
monopoly be created thereby.

4. UnauthorizedInsurers: One of the more difficult problems under state regulation
has been how to supervise effectively the activities of unauthorized insurers, such
as companies doing solely a "mail order" business conducted outside the state.
Even since enactment of the McCarran Act re-affirming state regulation, the Federal
Trade Commission has been disposed to enter this field. It did so on February 3,
i95o, when fair trade practice rules relating to the advertising and sales promotion
of mail order insurance were promulgated by the Commission to become effective
thirty days thereafter. The rules were the outgrowth of a general industry conference of mail order insurers held in Chicago in December, 1947 and were adopted
subsequent to a public hearing held in Washington, D. C., in May, 1949.
Various state statutes concerning the activities of unauthorized insurers and their
agents existed even prior to the McCarran Act 6 In order further to cope with
this problem, a uniform bill known as the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act has
been proposed by the N.A.I.C. and the All-Industry Committee. The statute provides a method of substituted service of process upon unauthorized insurers and
defines conduct which constitutes "doing business" in a state for purposes of jurisdiction. Laws based upon this model have been enacted in fifteen states5
5. Accident and Health Regulation: All states but two5" require the filing and
approval of policy forms for accident and health coverage. The general pattern of
regulation authorizes the Commissioner to disapprove, after notice and hearing, any
form containing inequitable or deceptive provisions. To implement statutory requirements and to secure greater uniformity in administration, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has adopted an Official Guide governing the filing
and approval of policy forms 9 The development of a greater degree of uniformity
" Cal., Conn., Ill., Ind., Mass., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Pa., and Wash. In some states, e.g., Tennessee,
this subject is covered in the Fair Trade Practice Law.
o See conviction of such an agent in Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440 (1946).
"'Cal., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ill., Iowa, Kan., Me., Md., Mich., Neb., N. H., N. Y., Pa., Texas.
Such statutes probably are constitutional. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 339
U. S. 643 (1950).
s Alabama and Tennessee.
See PsOCEEDoNos, N.A.I.C. 271-285 (77th Sess. 1946).

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

in existing statutory regulation of this segment of the insurance business is presently
under study by the N.A.I.C2
V
THE FuTuRE: A CRITIQUE

We have reviewed the succession of events which led insurance to seek increased
governmental supervision of its affairs. The comprehensive nature of the new regulation, superimposed upon a pyramid of other state statutes governing an insurer's
affairs from birth through life to death, has been noted. What will be the effect
of vesting in fifty-two separate Insurance Departments these new broad powers over
an interstate industry? Can so complex a system, essentially created as a legal answer
to a legal problem, function in a practical manner so that insurance may meet the
demands of the insuring public?
The texts of the new regulatory laws do not provide the answer. The general
enactment of uniform statutes, substantially following state laws under which
the industry had survived for many years, was necessary. Such action prevented
chaos, but it could not assure success of the system. Nor would the future of the
industry be altered by minor changes in the statutes, advocated as vital by pleaders
of special interests.
It has been well said that the life of the law has not been logic, but experience.
Such also has been and will be the history of insurance. The statutory provisions
may be helpful or harmful, but in no event will they be determinative. This is
especially true because we are dealing with administrative law. Recognizing law as
a rule of action, we must realize that the enactment of administrative statutes is not
so important as their interpretation and administration. A knowing or willful administrator, armed with a simple statute, is a more potent force for good or evil than the
ordinary man charged with enforcement of a comprehensive and seemingly rigid
code.
Experience since the laws became effective means little. First, like the single
blessing often accompanying woes, the industry generally has shared in the prosperity
of the nation. While losses were great, the premium income rose in such fashion
that responsible insurers did not strain for every additional insured or agent. There
have been increased signs that this condition has been changing, but until now a
desperate need for new business has seldom driven companies or producers to the
weapons of the hungry.

Furthermore, the Insurance Departments granted these great new powers have
approached their responsibilities with commendable wariness.

This cannot be

charged simply to lack of appropriations or unfamiliarity with the laws. In the best
traditions of all insurance, they have exercised restraint.

The industry accordingly

has not yet felt the full potential impact of such regulation as could be achieved under
the statutes.
o See PROCEEDINGs, N. A. I. C. 393-394 (79th Sess. X948); id. at 299-315, 404-415 (8oth Sess. 1949).
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There have been events with significance for the future. We can note the growing necessity in every line of insurance for national rating procedures with ultimate
direction at a national level; the not unexpected provincialism which has led those
in some states to close their eyes to all beyond their borders; the resistance of
orthodox industry groups to the necessary but unorthodox; perplexities created as
multiple line operation changes to a reality from a theory. Examples of all these
spring to mind.
So, too, general lines of contention are being drawn in the rating forums: The
stock companies complain of increasing and unrealistic rigidity; the mutuals, of
insufficient uniformity; the independents, of being asked too many questions. Behind the usual cries of "free enterprise" and "public interest" lies the desire of all
for the maintenance of a position enabling them to compete for a fair share of the
business. No one of the contenders can afford to permit the new laws to become
a boon to their competitors or the means of their own oppression and gradual extinction.
All of these are important and to each could be devoted a lengthy treatment.
But they remain problems of a specific nature, to be solved by advocacy, negotiation, reasonable compromise, and, at most, amendments to the various regulatory
statutes. In a survey such as this, it would appear appropriate to examine other
matters of fundamental principle, matters which will determine whether the present
system of state regulation will continue or be discarded. At times it seems academic
and unrealistic to speak in terms of general principle rather than the immediate
and practical issues. Yet premises come before conclusions. Rather than attempt to
determine here the specific problems, let us consider five basic relationships. It is
upon the proper maintenance of these that the survival of state regulation depends.
First is the relationship of the states to the Federal Government, specifically the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. There should be no
temporizing or cavilling here. If the system of state regulation is to be given a fair
trial, it must be attempted without continual interference by federal authorities. The
Federal Trade Commission recently issued a six-volume report on the status of
state regulation of insurance, an objective study properly undertaken to determine
the extent of F.T.C. responsibilities. If any evidence were needed, the report assuredly demonstrates that least required at the moment are more laws or directives by
more public authorities. The report enumerates the almost fantastic number of
statutes and administrative rules under which the industry now labors. There are no
such statutes and administrators governing the daily actions of the ordinary industries
policed by the F.T.C. Moreover, if a federal agency ever were created to supervise
the affairs of insurance, a tremendous staff of men trained in its specialized problems would be required. For an agency with general powers and duties to enter
such a field would be tragically shortsighted.
It further must be clearly understood that the present state rating laws are
diametrically opposed in letter and in spirit to the Sherman Act. Unrestrained
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competition is not to be applicable to the insurance industry under existing law.
Whether the business could or should live directly under the Sherman Act is no
longer open to question. It was advocated by the Department of Justice at the
time of the S.E.U.A. case, was considered by Congress, and since has been considered
by every state legislature. The McCarran Act and the new rating laws expressly
approve regulated violations of the federal antitrust laws, such as the operation of
the traditional insurance rating bureau. This is true even in those states whose
statutes seemingly pay lip service to the Sherman Act theory. Except for boycott,
coercion, and intimidation, any act repugnant to the federal antitrust laws may be
authorized by the states so long as public regulation is provided. This is a basic fact
which should not be avoided apologetically as something vaguely wrong; it should
be publicly stressed again and again, so that all may understand that every legislative body in the United States has determined that it is not in the public interest
to have the Sherman Act apply to the business of insurance in the unqualified manner in which it affects the ordinary industry.
So long as state regulation exists, the federal agencies must wholeheartedly cooperate with state authorities. If complaints are received, they should be referred to
the appropriate State Insurance Departments. As a matter of law, with minor exceptions no federal regulatory agency may act with respect to a matter concerning
insurance until it has been determined that no regulation by state law exists. But
as a matter of policy, the federal agencies should not take formal action on an insurance problem until at their request the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has reviewed it and admitted that it lies beyond their regulatory powers.
There can be few such admissions.
The relationship among the several states is probably the most complex, in theory.
Fortunately, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners provides an
established and vigorous organization capable of acting as a vehicle for effective
interstate cooperation. There accordingly is no mechanical problem. What remains,
however, is the question whether the individual Commissioner will abide by general
decisions after his return to his home state. It is fundamental that every state remain sovereign, and it is expected that decisions will be made in the light of local
conditions. These are among the very reasons why Congress has ordained that the
states, and not the Federal Government, shall regulate insurance. However, with
respect to interstate rating, national standard policy forms, and other similar problems, state authorities must bear uppermost in mind that they are regulating an
interstate industry. If the present system is ever substantially altered, it may be
attributed to a considerable extent to those who took the narrow view and sought
every pretext, to maintain it. A certain amount of this is inevitable. However, it
remains the continuing task of the National Association to obtain generally uniform
action on matters of interstate importance. The pitfall to be avoided, of course, is
proceeding too far in this respect and creating central bodies with such broad
negative powers, and such a lack of affirmative powers, that the industry would find
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itself faced by the disadvantages of federal regulation with none of the advantages.
While the entire problem is difficult and omnipresent, it appears that the leadership
of the National Association is meeting it with wisdom and foresight.
The relationship of the states and the industry is vital. Substantial dislocation
would result in a dismal countrywide panorama of public hearings, charges, countercharges, injunctions, and writs. What are the principles which must prevail? In last
analysis the most important is that both government and industry understand that
every right is accompanied by a correlative duty. We live in an era when most
talk is about rights and little about duties. The Commissioner or executive whose
exclusive concern is to find his rights and assert them, does a grave disservice.
Statutory requirements are important, but equally important is awareness of the
principle as a necessary rule of conduct for fair play. The Commissioner may have
the right to issue an order, but he has a duty not to do so until he has given to those
affected fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. The insurer may have the
right by "flash filing" to issue a policy which cannot be set aside, but it has the duty
not to do so when it knows that indefensible discrimination will result.
Government and industry meet only through men. Intensive state regulation
of an interstate industry presents tremendous human problems, delicate and taxing.
They will be resolved only by good faith, an appreciation of the problems faced by
the other man, and fairness blessed with a touch of charity.
The relationship of the components of the industry to one another is next. It
would be too much to expect the spirit which generally characterized All Industry
activity to continue indefinitely. A turning market brings into sharp relief the
basic differences in interest between stock and mutual companies, the organized and
unorganized, the agent and the broker. Yet these are disputes as old as the industry. The new regulatory laws may create more problems, but the insurance
industry has demonstrated in the past that its components can battle hard but fairly.
Probably the most difficult such problem presented by the S.E.U.A. decision and
remaining unanswered is acquisition cost. The present situation is desired by few;
it was born not of reason but historical accident. Continuing study must be given
so that a sound solution is available when action is imperative.
The final relationship we consider is that of insurance and the American public.
In varying ways the public is represented by the Insurance Departments, producers,
and others. But here we speak of it in the broadest sense of all within insurance and
all outside it.
Insurance has passed through a severe crisis. It is history now that it faced and
survived that crisis with remarkable facility and vigor. The remedy selected is being
given a fair trial. It is reasonable to hope that we are entering a period wherein
there can be a return of concentrated effort devoted to the true business of insurance.
For a few years most of the industry was on the defensive. Justifiable institutions
and practices born of necessity were to be jettisoned because of legal theories and an
all-pervading fear. Legal opinions were executive decisions. The time for that is
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past. We are an industry which today is probably more free of unethical conduct
than any other of comparable size; yet we are subjected to more public regulation
and are the victims of more discriminatory legislation.
The future for insurance is bright. It will remain so if the industry continues to
go forward. The public demand for its services and resources grows greater each
year. New forms of protection are sought by the public; in new areas of social
security, the private insurance industry is being given an opportunity to demonstrate
its worth. These challenges must be met. American insurance must be able to
fill every new demand, must market the right product at the right price. Without
casting sound judgment aside, we must never reject the new simply because it is
untried.
A sorely beset industry has overcome unprecedented hazards and difficulties.
While the future is not wholly untroubled, this is a time for insurance to recognize
that many of its greatest threats are over and that its future lies in demonstrating
to the general public that it is a great and essential industry, worthy of protection
and support.

